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FRIENDS OF STELLENBOSCH MOUNTAIN

2023 Draft CITP: FSM Comments, Questions and Criticism

12 May 2023

1 Background and motivation

- 1.1 **The law, budget constraints and climate change realities all prescribe investment into public transport and NMT infrastructure as priority over road-related infrastructure.** National and provincial legislation and strategy and even the Stellenbosch IDP and MSDF are all clear on this.¹
- 1.2 Obviously, public transport is impossible without the underlying **public transport infrastructure.** The City of Cape Town and George Municipality have made significant strides in putting into place the necessary infrastructure and are now reaping the benefits. Stellenbosch, by contrast, is far behind on public transport infrastructure and must catch up urgently.
- 1.3 At present, **The Stellenbosch public transport infrastructure situation is catastrophic.** Stellenbosch has a well-developed road system but virtually no public transport infrastructure. The rail system is currently dysfunctional. Bus services exist only for schools and special needs. Taxi ranks constitute the only current public transport infrastructure even worth mentioning. While Non-Motorised Transport (NMT) is important for short trips, it plays little to no role for longer distances and the associated bigger infrastructure needs.
- 1.4 Public transport oriented mobility plans were put together by a task team over three years but canned by the municipality in 2000. Stellenbosch was also selected in 2007 as a priority for public transport, and the present draft CITP is the fourth one. However, public transport sections of previous CITPs were never taken seriously or implemented. Far from being innovative, Stellenbosch Municipality has remained in a cars-and-roads-only mindset. The emphasis remains on roads: road building, road maintenance and road planning. A Roads Master Plan (RMP) was compiled in great detail and its many projects continue to dominate planning and spending. Stellenbosch Municipality explicitly rejected efforts in the years 2016 to 2019 to make use of available grant funding such as the PSTP and has historically invested very little into public transport infrastructure.

¹Examples: the *National Land Transport Act*, the associated *2016 Minimum Requirements*, the March 2023 *National Land Transport Strategic Framework*, Western Cape planning documents such as the *Provincial Spatial Development Framework*, the WC Government Medium Term Expenditure Framework Vote 8, etc all say the same thing: public transport must be prioritised.

- 1.5 There is therefore a catastrophic backlog in public transport and related infrastructure which has built up over decades. Spending on reducing the backlog in public transport infrastructure is therefore critical for the future of Stellenbosch.
- 1.6 In spite of the legislation and the backlog and in line with the outdated approach of the municipality, the present draft CITP makes no effort to comply with the legally prescribed prioritisation of public transport but on the contrary only perpetuates and worsens the already bad imbalance in planning and spending in favour of roads and road-related spending.
- 1.7 Planning documents come and go, but what remains are the completed projects, both good and bad, which dominate the physical and mobility situation for decades to come. The motivation for the budget analysis presented below is hence to analyse budgeted infrastructure projects with respect to their contribution to future sustainability.

2 Budget analysis

- 2.1 In Appendix I, we analyse 3-year and 10-year budgets in depth, categorising mobility infrastructure projects as roads-related or as public transport-related.² Since provincial grants play such a big role, we have included them into our analysis. Western Cape Government (WCG) allocation to mobility infrastructure in Stellenbosch far exceeds that of SM spending (R928m compared to R245m; see below).

Our findings are devastating.

- a. To start with our conclusions:

Of the total of R1.173 billion jointly budgeted for the next three years by Western Cape Government (WCG) and Stellenbosch Municipality (SM) for mobility infrastructure, 95 percent is allocated to roads and road-related projects. The remaining 4 percent are split between public transport and NMT infrastructure and miscellaneous spending.

With respect to the (Municipality-only) 10-year horizon:

Of the R859m in mobility infrastructure projects, the Municipality intends to spend 65 percent on new roads and a further 20 percent on road maintenance, i.e. 85 percent on roads. The 10 percent (R84m) to be spent on public transport is dominated for the next 10 years by NMT (R31m) and a single footbridge (R26m), leaving only R27m for the rest.

- b. For detail on a project-by-project level, see Appendix I. The Rand amounts quoted here are taken directly from the totals calculated in that Appendix.
- c. Of its total R928m (MTEF Votes 8 and 10) relevant budget allocations, WCG allocates R210m to road upgrading and new roads, while R718m, by far the largest amount in all categories, is allocated to road maintenance.
- d. WCG allocates **zero Rands** to public transport infrastructure in Stellenbosch, while more than R1billion is granted to Cape Town and George. This catastrophic omission is the result of Stellenbosch Municipality actively cancelling the previous PSTP programme and instead proactively agitating for grant allocations for roadbuilding instead.

²We use the collective term *mobility infrastructure* to refer to rail, road, public transport and NMT infrastructure. The term includes also associated works such as stormwater, bridges, parking space and parking garages, sidewalks and pedestrianised roads, taxi ranks, cycling paths etc. Mobility infrastructure excludes water, electricity, sewage and other infrastructure projects.

- e. Of the total municipal (MTREF) 3-year budget of R245million allocated to mobility infrastructure, **R145m (59 percent) is allocated towards new road building** and another **R43million (18 percent) to road maintenance** over and above the huge WCG maintenance grant. The allocation of R43million to public transport infrastructure (also 18 percent) is dominated by a single project, a Kayamandi pedestrian bridge (R26m). The remaining 5 percent goes to miscellaneous projects.
- f. The crucial **Adam Tas Corridor** project, the centrepiece of sustainable Stellenbosch town and mobility restructuring, is budgeted to receive a total of R2million for a “Transport Study” and nothing for any actual infrastructure.
- g. We could not find a 10-year project list within WCG documents. Appendix C of the draft CITP contains, however, budget plans for the next 10 years. That SM 10-year budget allocation is even worse than the 3-year one: Of the total of R859million over 10 years, R561m or 65 percent is planned for new and upgraded roads, with R171m allocated to road maintenance. Again, public transport infrastructure is completely neglected and receives only R84million over ten years (10 percent) which includes the R26m Kayamandi bridge. SM allocates **Zero Rands** to fund Adam Tas Corridor public transport projects beyond the R2m of the 3-year budget allocated to a “Transport Study”.

2.2 Operational budgets and planning

The analysis so far includes only **capital budgets**, while corresponding **operational budgets** should be added. Relevant operational costs would departmental posts and salaries, transport authorities, regulation and administration of public transport.

To our knowledge, Stellenbosch Municipality has just one or two posts allocated to public transport matters, while the overwhelming majority of mobility-related posts and operational costs are dedicated to road-related matters, including planning and maintenance.

By contrast, Cape Town already has a fully functional Urban Mobility Directorate (see tct.gov.za) and George also has a transport authority. Stellenbosch has nothing. The draft CITP makes no provision for any future transport authority.

Unsurprisingly, Stellenbosch has made no application for a Provincial Transport Operational Grant (PTOG).

3 Conclusions from the budget analysis

- 3.1 It is of high concern that a large number of the projects listed in CITP Appendix C (and reproduced in our Appendix I below) are to be sourced from “*CRR – Own Funding*” which refers to the SM *Capital Replacement Reserve*. In other words, SM wants to use its capital reserves to fund projects whose spending priorities are not proven and whose outcomes do not justify the tapping of reserve funds.

All projects earmarked for CRR funding should be stopped until their long-term merit is assessed and proven.


- 3.2 While George and Cape Town actively developed their public transport programmes, Stellenbosch Municipality did not. As mentioned, Stellenbosch Municipality has in the last few years actively terminated existing PSTP programmes, despite the WCG having identified Stellenbosch as priority for public transport. In addition, in 2021 SM approached the then Western Cape Department of Public Transport and Public Works (DPTW) which has since been split into two departments. On request, DPTW in August 2021 provided a so-called Assessment Report in terms of Section 78(1) of the Municipal Systems Act.

- 3.3 In their list of projects, the budgets reveal the fundamental underlying problem: The draft CITP and the Stellenbosch Municipality are still driven by an **engineering- and**

roads-driven approach in which the private motor car is king and all other needs are subordinated to it.

3.4 The inclusion of the Eastern Link Road and similar projects further reveal that the basis for prioritisation is not the law or public need, but the needs and demand of property developers. In the case of the Eastern Link Road, these are *Brandwacht Land Development* and *Blaauwklippen Agricultural Estates*, both of which about the Eastern Link Road and would directly benefit from its construction and in turn subsidise its construction. We consider the Eastern Link Road in Appendix II in more detail.

3.5 This **developer-and-car** chain of causality is therefore



A prime example of this illegal and erroneous approach is the so-called Roads Master Plan, which was compiled independently, based on personal whims and developer's requests and without regard for the legal hierarchy.

3.6 By contrast, the **legally prescribed chain of causality** is



3.7 The legality of the resulting actions is explored in Section 6 below.

4 CITP Chapter 8 on “Transport Demand Management”

4.1 The draft CITP has a Chapter 8 entitled “Transport Demand Management (TDM) Strategy”. The title itself tells the story: the AECOM consultant and the municipal Directorate of Infrastructure are so ignorant that they confuse “Travel Demand Management” with “Transport Demand Management”. There is no such term as “Transport Demand Management”. The National Land Transport Act section 1 defines TDM as

“travel demand management” means a system of actions to maximise the capacity of the transport system for the movement of people and goods rather than vehicles, among others, through increasing vehicle occupancy, developing priority measures for public transport, encouraging travel during off-peak periods, shifting demand between modes, restricting the space available for parking, adjusting the price of parking, and other appropriate measures;

4.2 Not surprisingly, Chapter 8 of the draft CITP is but a shell with little to no content. It exists only to satisfy – in letter but not in spirit – the requirements of the law as contained in the *2016 Minimum Requirements*.

- Section 8.1 of the CITP comprises a list of TDM-related issues contained in other documents.
- Section 8.2, called *TDM Categories*, is a little half-page itemised list of concepts without any substance.
- Section 8.3 called *TDM Objectives* in its ignorance redefines TDM while not being aware of even the above definition contained in the NLTA, not to speak of any unpacking or application of it in the Stellenbosch context.
- Section 8.4 entitled *Future Solutions / Proposed Interventions* is a meaningless one-page table.

4.3 Returning to the NLTA definition of **travel demand management**: the draft CITP and the Stellenbosch Directorate of Infrastructure must, by law, develop plans with respect to

- increasing vehicle occupancy,
- developing priority measures for public transport,
- encouraging travel during off-peak periods,
- shifting demand between modes,
- restricting the space available for parking,
- adjusting the price of parking, and other appropriate measures.

Not one of these legally prescribed measures is even attempted in the CITP. On the contrary,

- the roadbuilding encourages lower vehicle occupancy,
- no priority measures for public transport are in sight,
- all the arguments for roadbuilding are based on peak hours and peak loads,
- Stellenbosch Municipality is embarking on a massive program of parking provision, and no parking fee increases are contemplated.

4.4 One of the simplest and short-term effective measures would be that of congestion charges, combined with a park-and-ride infrastructure and shuttle services.

4.5 George Municipality has been highlighting what is possible. Its public transport system now generates 25,000 to 30,000 passenger trips per day. In the context of roads and cars, that is equivalent to taking 15,000 to 20,000 car trips off the roads.

If Stellenbosch had taken its public transport infrastructure seriously in the past, there would be no congestion and no need for additional roads.

4.6 The current occupancy ratio (number of persons per car) averages 1.2 in Stellenbosch. Measures to increase this would be sufficient to relieve congestions and render all new roadbuilding unnecessary. The CITP does not even try to do so.

5 Section 78 report by DTPW

We briefly mentioned in Section 3 the existence of a Section 78(1) assessment report. Authored by the Western Cape Department of Transport and Public Works, *The provision of public transport services in Stellenbosch Municipality*, this Section 78(1) assessment report is dated August 2021. It appeared as Appendix 1 in Item 11.6.1 of the agenda of Stellenbosch Municipality Council meeting of 29 March 2023, almost two years later. This council item is reproduced in full in Appendix VI. It is remarkable for several reasons:

5.1 This 2021 DTPW assessment report makes strong statements with regard to the economic viability of public transport systems. With reference to experience in George and Cape Town, the report claims that an “incremental approach” to the provision of public transport should be followed in Stellenbosch and that

[DTPW] is unwilling to replicate the George-model in future municipalities and has developed a Provincial Sustainable Transport Programme to plan and implement a different approach to public transport improvement in partnership with priority local municipalities. The PSTP will support alternative approaches to public transport improvement which are lower in cost, recognise the complexity of industry transition. The Incremental Approach is core to the Programme and includes an initial focus on getting public transport basics right, while progressively moving toward improved public transport services over time.

- 5.2 This report was clearly commissioned in early 2021 but was not made public. Instead, it was published only years later and in the same agenda which also itemized the draft CITP and other key municipal plans.
- 5.3 The CITP makes no mention whatsoever of this Section 78 report, even though it was available for nearly two years and is clearly relevant to public transport. This omission is highly irregular and possibly unlawful for several reasons:
- a. **Misleading of the consultant or by the consultant:** Either Stellenbosch Municipality and/or DTPW withheld crucial information from the very consultant tasked with compiling the CITP (in other words, the consultant was misled), or the consultant decided to make no use of it and not to mention it, thereby writing a misleading CITP in which material facts are concealed.
 - b. **Misleading of Council:** It is possible that Council was misled by separating this Section 78 report from the CITP item. The Section 78 Item does mention the CITP in the agenda, but the CITP Item does not mention the Section 78 Item.
 - c. **Misleading of the public:** In both cases, the public was being misled, since the draft CITP published for public comment omits any mention of the existence and import of the Section 78(1) report.
- 5.4 **Noninclusion of DTPW Section 78 conclusions and recommendations in the CITP:** Whatever the chain of events or cause, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the 2021 DTPW report and the 2023 draft CITP. If, as claimed by DTPW, there is now an entirely different “PSTP” and “incremental” approach to public transport, why does such PSTP not appear at all in the CITP? If, as the MTEF claims, it is a success and implementable anywhere, why does the CITP not make use of it? Why does Stellenbosch not apply for a PSTP grant?
- 5.5 **Irrelevance of Section 78 to capital expenditure projects:** Secondly, the provincial PSTP is a purely operational programme (see Vote 8 Programme 2 of the 2023 MTEF). If the Section 78 recommendation to follow an “incremental approach” is valid at all, it would seem to not apply to the crucial public transport capital infrastructure projects, and it provides no excuse to Stellenbosch not to prioritise such projects on a big scale.
- 5.6 At the moment, the Section 78 recommendation for an “incremental approach” appears to be an excuse to not do or spend anything at all with respect to public transport and related infrastructure. Neither the law nor regulations nor strategic frameworks can be misconstrued to an extent that their main priorities are thereby completely negated.

6 Other legal aspects

Apart from the many weaknesses of the CITP, and apart from the other grounds and reasons why the CITP may be considered unlawful, we here list those sections of the National Land Transport Act (NLTA) and the related Minimum Requirements which appear to be not satisfied by the current CITP draft and its contents.

- 6.1 The fact that 95 percent of proposed spending is to be allocated to roads and road-related projects is a clear violation of the substance of the law.
- 6.2 As set out elsewhere, the CITP has pro forma followed the chapter structure set out in the prescribed NLTA Minimum Requirements. It has not, however, applied the provisions at all, as the example of Chapter 8 set out in Section 4 shows. Similarly, Chapter 7 of the CITP formally follows the format but not the intentions of the Minimum Requirements.

- 6.3 According to Section 36 of the NLTA, the MEC may approve a CITP only if the criteria of s36(2) are satisfied.
- 6.4 Rail aspects have not been adequately addressed in the CITP: see section 36(5) of the NLTA.
- 6.5 It remains to be confirmed whether the content and recommendations both of the CITP and of the Section 78 report comply with the following sections of the National Land Transport Act:
- section 11(1)(c)(xi) on promotion of public transport
 - section 11(1)(c)(xvi) on traffic management techniques aimed at improving road traffic movement;
 - section 11(1)(c)(xxii) on applying travel demand management.

7 The way forward

7.1 Fundamental restart

The current draft CITP, Stellenbosch Municipality and Western Cape Government mobility infrastructure spending priorities are unsustainable because of the excessive emphasis and funding of road infrastructure and neglect of public transport infrastructure. There has to be a fundamental re-assessment and re-alignment of spending to finance mobility infrastructure projects which have a future.

7.2 Dismiss the current consultant and throw away the draft CITP

The draft CITP has complied with the formal requirements of the Minimum Requirements law only in the most superficial sense. It has not applied of the underlying intentions and results in the applications. In particular, the unwarranted and almost exclusive focus on road and road-related spending makes the CITP unfit for its intended purpose. Hence the present draft should be scrapped altogether, a new CITP consultant should be appointed and a new draft CITP should be compiled.

7.3 Withdraw the Section 78(1) assessment

Western Cape Government should withdraw the Section 78(1) assessment report written by DTPW in August 2021 and require Stellenbosch Municipality to come up with a viable public transport plan and appropriate budgetary allocations.

7.4 Prioritise the Adam Tas Corridor

In Stellenbosch, the obvious and urgent mobility infrastructure spending priority is the central transport precinct of the Adam Tas Corridor (ATC). Hence the new CITP and revised MTEF and MTREF budgets should give absolute priority to funding both the planning and implementation of public transport infrastructure in the central precinct of the Adam Tas Corridor, centered on the existing or hopefully rebuilt railway station.

Subsequently, the link between ATC and town centre (University Avenue) must be prioritised.

7.5 Road maintenance

Evidently, the existing infrastructure assets must be maintained. The current road network will for the foreseeable future remain important for mobility. However, a fundamental re-assessment of the cost-to-benefit ratio of road maintenance is necessary. Road maintenance swallows up R761million just in the coming three years, 65 percent of the entire funds available for mobility infrastructure. Maintenance spending is crowding out the far more important spending on public transport infrastructure.

One measure which can be implemented quickly and cheaply is a set of **very strict controls on heavy loads and freight** which is responsible for most of the damage. There must be many more weighbridges and a mobile unit capable of intercepting trucks on the streets. It is also easy to promulgate regulations limiting the maximum weight of freighters on certain roads.

7.6 **Drastically reduce new road building**

While a budget for maintenance of *existing* roads should no doubt be retained, the budget for *new* roads must be drastically reduced and re-allocated to the corresponding true priorities. In particular, the following projects have no merit and should be eliminated:

- a. Both the northward and southward extensions of Wildebosch Road in Paradyskloof as part of the Eastern Link Road, as they are irrational and unnecessary. The Eastern Link Road serves no purpose except those of luxury housing developers Brandwacht Land Development and Blaauwklippen Agricultural Estates adjacent to it.
- b. Intersection upgrades around the Adam Tas Corridor must be scrapped. These include the Adam Tas/R44, the R44/Alexander, the R44/Plankenbrug and the R44/Merriman intersections. The Dorp Street West dualling must also be stopped. More than R100million will be saved. These amounts should be allocated to the transport-centered designs and implementations around the central public transport precinct around the railway station.

7.7 The Jamestown so-called “Transport Network” should be drastically reduced in scope. The extension of Skoolstraat is important, as are connectors into future southwards expansions of Jamestown Phase 4. However, there is no merit in a northward extension of Pajero Avenue towards Blaauwklippen Road as it directly traverses viable agricultural land which should not be developed.

7.8 The Western Bypass north of Adam Tas must be scrapped altogether. It is irrational and directly contradicts the strategy of focusing mobility infrastructure development along the main axes of development with the railway at the centre. The R88million so saved should be used to start with a light rail connection from the railway station westwards towards Droë Dyke and eastwards towards the Bergzicht terrain.

7.9 The Welgevonden Road Extension (R44 to R304) should be scrapped. The saved amount of R64million should also be applied towards upgrading the public transport along the ATC-Kayamandi northern corridor.

7.10 There is merit in dualling Bird Street and expansion of the R44 between Jamestown and van Rheeде, as long as the increase in capacity prioritises public transport lanes.

7.11 The Adam Tas - Technopark Link road must be delayed until the priority upgrades of existing R44 and Bird Street upgrades have been completed.

7.12 **Parking**

As set out in legislation, parking must be restricted rather than expanded and made more expensive. The revised CITP should scrap all current plans for parking garages and parking areas in the Stellenbosch CBD. In line with international experience, parking fees should also be significantly increased. Simultaneously, the new budget must provide for park-and-ride schemes to the south, west and north of Stellenbosch town centre as well as near the central railway node.

7.13 **Travel Demand Management**

Implement an active programme to implement TDM by eg surcharges based on passenger numbers along congested routes and by congestion charging. Use the money so generated

to directly subsidise multi-passenger vehicles using the same routes such as taxis and lift clubs by, for example, lanes dedicated to such users.

7.14 **Densification**

The CITP has not taken into account or applied the SPLUMA and MSDF requirements of densification. *Densification* refers to increasing to an increase in the density of housing units **within the existing urban edge**. Densification may not be misconstrued as so-called **urban infill** which attempts to appropriate existing agricultural and open space for additional development. A new CITP must make direct reference and assess quantitatively the mobility needs and resulting projects resulting from the Adam Tas Corridor and high-density development northwards and westwards thereof.

7.15 **Human Resources**

It is high time for the 20th-century road-and-car mindset still prevalent both in Stellenbosch and in the provincial Department of Infrastructure to be changed. New appointments are needed who understand modern mobility and apply the law are urgently needed.

I Budget Analysis: Roads and Nonroad Infrastructure Spending

2023 Stellenbosch Draft CITP Appendix C: Budgeted Projects over three and over ten years (2023 to 2033)																
Also including provincial grants which were forgotten in the CITP																
Date: May 2023																
Author: Friends of Stellenbosch Mountain																
Project Name	Funding Source	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27	2027/28	2028 to 2033	2023 to 2033	3-year New Road/Car	3-year Maintenance Road/Car	3-year Mobility Transport	10-year New Road/Car	10-year Maintenance Road/Car	10-year Mobility Transport	10-year Undetermined
Department Roads and Stormwater																
Capital Projects																
Adam Tas Intersection Upgrades	CRR (own funds)							12 000 000	12 000 000				12 000 000			
Bridge Construction	IUDG	15 000 000	5 000 000				6 000 000	11 000 000	11 000 000	5 000 000			11 000 000			
Bridge Construction	CRR (own funds)	2 700 000														
Devon Valley Rd	CRR (own funds)															
Dorp Street West dualing	CRR (own funds)		600 000					1 000 000	1 600 000							
Klamruts Transport Network	CRR (own funds)		5 000 000					32 000 000	32 000 000	32 000 000			32 000 000			
Lanqueob Access Road and Bridge	DC-Roads		12 000 000		15 000 000			3 000 000	3 000 000							
Lanqueob Access Road and Bridge	CRR (own funds)		3 000 000													
Parking Area Upgrades - Franschoek	DC-Parking		711 442													
Parking Area Upgrades - Stellenbosch	DC-Parking		800 000													
R304 West Kayamandi Intersection Construction	DC															
Stormwater Drainage - Kayamandi and Enkarni	DC-Stormwater															
Stormwater Drainage - Kayamandi and Enkarni	CRR (own funds)	1 000 000	1 500 000	3 000 000	7 000 000	7 000 000	1 500 000	20 000 000	20 000 000	6 000 000			20 000 000			
Wilderness Extension to Tsoelike Park (Eastern link)	CRR (own funds)							15 500 000	17 000 000				17 000 000			
Planning Maintenance Operations																
Ad hoc Minor Upgrading of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000	5 000 000	7 000 000	1 400 000	2 100 000	700 000				2 100 000			
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	827 248					35 000 000	58 000 000	58 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	400 000	400 000	400 000	400 000	400 000	2 000 000	4 000 000	4 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	400 000	400 000	400 000	400 000	400 000	2 000 000	4 000 000	4 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	1 250 000	1 250 000	1 250 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 250 000	4 250 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	4 200 000	5 000 000	5 000 000	7 000 000	8 000 000	2 000 000	6 000 000	6 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
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Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc Reconstruction of Roads (WC024)	CRR (own funds)	500 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	500 000	500 000	1 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000							
Ad hoc																

Project Name	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27	2027/28	2028 to 2033	2023 to 2033	2023 to 2033	3-year	3-year	3-year	3-year	10-year	10-year	10-year	10-year
Traffic Signal Control Installation, Upgrading Traffic Signals and Associated Component	1 500 000	500 000	500 000	500 000	500 000	500 000	2 000 000	4 500 000	1 500 000	0	0	0	0	4 500 000	0	0	0
Traffic Signal Management System	600 000	200 000	-	-	300 000	-	600 000	1 100 000	1 000 000	0	0	0	0	1 000 000	0	0	0
Universal Access Implementation	13 964 782	20 450 000	17 379 950	21 650 000	27 350 000	31 250 000	89 650 000	207 729 950	53 129 950	0	0	0	0	192 879 950	2 600 000	3 800 000	8 450 000
TOTAL as per CIP	13 964 782	20 450 000	17 379 950	21 650 000	27 350 000	31 250 000	89 650 000	207 729 950	53 129 950	1 600 000	1 100 000	3 650 000	2 600 000	2 600 000	3 800 000	8 450 000	
Total (own calculations)	13 964 782	20 450 000	17 379 950	21 650 000	27 350 000	31 250 000	89 650 000	207 729 950	53 129 950	1 600 000	1 100 000	3 650 000	2 600 000	2 600 000	3 800 000	8 450 000	
									59 479 950	Crosscheck total							
Department Transport Planning																	
Capital Projects																	
Adam Tas - Technopark Link Road	2 300 000	3 000 000	5 000 000	20 000 000	30 000 000	30 000 000	88 000 000	88 000 000	28 000 000	0	0	0	0	88 000 000	0	0	0
Bicycle Lockup Facilities	200 000	300 000	-	-	500 000	-	900 000	1 300 000	0	0	0	0	0	1 300 000	0	0	0
Kayamandi Ped Bridge (R304, River and Railway Line)	3 000 000	16 000 000	-	10 000 000	-	-	26 000 000	26 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	26 000 000	0	0	0
Kayamandi Ped Bridge (R304, River and Railway Line)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DC-Roads	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Planning Maintenance Operations																	
Adam Tas - Corridor Transport Study	500 000	1 000 000	-	1 000 000	-	-	2 000 000	2 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	2 000 000	0	0	0
Comprehensive Integrated Transport Plan	600 000	600 000	600 000	1 000 000	2 000 000	1 000 000	6 000 000	11 200 000	0	0	0	2 200 000	0	0	0	0	11 200 000
Continued feasibility studies to establish a transport operating company	-	-	600 000	-	-	-	600 000	-	600 000	0	0	600 000	0	0	600 000	0	0
Cycle Plan - Design and implementation	784 739	500 000	-	500 000	500 000	500 000	2 500 000	4 500 000	0	0	1 000 000	0	0	4 500 000	0	0	4 500 000
Development business model transport service persons with disabilities	600 000	-	-	2 000 000	-	-	42 000 000	44 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	44 000 000	0	0	0
Feasibility Study for Adam Tas (Devon Valley) to R304 (Kayamandi)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Feasibility Study for Existing Bridge or Add Bridge Erecte River Stellenbosch CBD	-	-	-	400 000	-	-	62 800 000	62 800 000	400 000	0	0	0	0	62 800 000	0	0	0
Feasibility Study for Extension R304 to R44	-	-	2 000 000	-	-	-	62 000 000	64 000 000	2 000 000	0	0	0	0	64 000 000	0	0	0
Freight Strategy for Stellenbosch and Franschhoek	1 000 000	500 000	-	3 000 000	3 000 000	4 000 000	20 000 000	31 000 000	0	0	4 000 000	0	0	31 000 000	0	0	1 000 000
Non-Motorised Transport Implementation	3 000 000	1 000 000	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Park and Ride (Transport Interchange)	100 000	250 000	-	1 700 000	-	-	250 000	250 000	0	0	250 000	0	0	250 000	0	0	0
Pedestrian Streets in Stellenbosch	-	-	3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000	9 000 000	9 000 000	0	0	1 700 000	0	0	1 700 000	0	0	0
Provision Bulk Parking Planning & Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Public Transport Infrastructure (Public Transport Shelters and Embayments)	400 000	400 000	-	800 000	1 000 000	-	3 000 000	4 500 000	0	0	400 000	0	0	1 200 000	0	0	0
Public Transport Facilities (Taxi Ranks)	-	-	500 000	2 000 000	-	-	2 600 000	2 600 000	0	0	500 000	0	0	4 500 000	0	0	0
Public Transport Planning - WC024	-	165 278	-	500 000	-	-	500 000	500 000	0	0	0	0	0	2 600 000	0	0	0
Public Transport Service (Inclusive of Mobility Impaired)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Re-design of Bergzicht Public Transport Facility	1 800 000	1 800 000	-	-	-	-	1 000 000	1 000 000	0	0	1 000 000	0	0	1 000 000	0	0	0
Stellenbosch - Bicycle network	500 000	500 000	-	-	-	-	600 000	600 000	600 000	0	0	0	0	600 000	0	0	0
Stellenbosch Tour Bus Parking	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 500 000	0	0	0	0	1 500 000	0	0	0
Taxi Rank - Franschhoek	-	-	1 500 000	-	-	-	2 000 000	2 000 000	2 000 000	0	0	0	0	2 000 000	0	0	0
Technopark Kerf and Channel Upgrade	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	361 750 000	0	0	0	0	361 750 000	0	0	0
Update Roads Master Plan for WC024	15 000 017	28 850 000	19 800 000	40 800 000	37 400 000	35 500 000	189 300 000	361 750 000	45 500 000	0	0	0	0	271 900 000	0	0	12 200 000
TOTAL as per CIP	15 000 017	28 850 000	19 800 000	40 800 000	37 400 000	35 500 000	189 300 000	361 750 000	45 500 000	0	41 350 000	2 700 000	2 700 000	271 900 000	0	77 650 000	12 200 000
Total (own calculations)	15 000 017	28 850 000	19 800 000	40 800 000	37 400 000	35 500 000	189 300 000	361 750 000	45 500 000	0	41 350 000	2 700 000	2 700 000	271 900 000	0	77 650 000	12 200 000
									89 550 000	Crosscheck total							
GRAND TOTAL as per CIP Appendix C	59 639 989	77 550 000	69 079 950	97 950 000	91 850 000	94 650 000	412 050 000	843 129 950	146 329 950	43 150 000	43 050 000	13 050 000	13 050 000	561 879 950	170 650 000	84 950 000	42 550 000
Grand Total (own calculations) excluding provincial grants	59 639 989	77 550 000	69 079 950	97 950 000	91 850 000	94 650 000	412 050 000	843 129 950	146 329 950	43 150 000	43 050 000	13 050 000	13 050 000	561 879 950	170 650 000	84 950 000	42 550 000
Percentages (excluding provincial grants)									59	18	18	5	5	85	20	10	5
Percentages (including provincial grants)									244 579 850	77	18	5	5	65	26	10	5
Provincial Grants (not included in 2023 Draft CIP)																	
Funding Source																	
CWDM Reseal	14 200 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CWDM Regrave	28 006 000	30 000 000	31 500 000	33 075 000	-	-	-	-	94 575 000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R310 Baden Powell (C914)	120 000 000	120 000 000	20 000 000	-	-	-	-	-	140 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C1092 SW/Stellenbosch	2 202 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CWDM Maintenance	112 565 000	142 317 000	145 017 000	163 558 000	-	-	-	-	450 892 000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C749 Paarl/Franschhoek	-	-	-	22 000 000	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C1217 - Heelshoogte-Pniel reseal	-	-	-	46 000 000	-	-	-	-	68 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C1225.1 NI-Stellenbosch reseal	-	-	-	60 000 000	-	-	-	-	60 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C1229.1 Paarl-Franschhoek reseal	-	-	-	45 000 000	-	-	-	-	45 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C1228 Old Paarl Road	-	-	-	5 000 000	-	-	-	-	65 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C1225 NI-Stellenbosch doubling	276 975 000	292 317 000	223 517 000	412 635 000	-	-	-	-	210 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total provincial grants (own calculations)	276 975 000	292 317 000	223 517 000	412 635 000	-	-	-	-	210 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
									928 487 000	3-year total							
TRUE GRAND TOTAL (including provincial grants)	369 867 000	292 596 950	223 517 000	510 565 000	-	-	-	-	355 329 950	761 617 000	43 050 000	13 050 000	13 050 000	855 879 950	170 650 000	84 950 000	42 550 000
Percentages (True Grand Total including provincial grants)									1 173 046 950	Crosscheck total							
Percentages (True Grand Total including provincial grants)									30	65	4	1	1	65	26	10	5
									244 579 850	77	18	5	5	65	26	10	5

II Example: the Eastern Link Road

1. Most of the new road projects listed in the CITP Appendix C, the MTREF budget, the Capital Expenditure Framework have little to no merit within the legally prescribed chain of causality of Section 3. Here we analyse by example of the Eastern Link Road (ELR) how nevertheless such projects end up being prioritised. It has a long and controversial history and has re-appeared yet again in Section 7.1.3.1 of the draft CITP and as two items in the 3-year budget.
2. Figure 7-1 of the CITP shows both the southern part (Wildebosch to Trumali) as Phase 1 and the northern part (Wildebosch to Techno Park) as Phase 2. Figure 7-1 of the CITP reproduces the corresponding figure in the Roads Master Plan of November 2022 as shown in Appendix III.
3. What both figures do *not* show is the logical continuation of this “Link” road northwards across the land of Farm 1049 Brandwacht, who are currently applying for development rights, and across the Welgevallen property of Stellenbosch University towards the Eerste Rivier.
4. Both purport to show that the “Link” road stops at Trumali Road. As such, this project is ludicrous and irrational. The traffic modelling shown in the RMP figure (see Appendix III) does not justify the costs of this project at all. It is blindingly obvious that this project makes sense only if it is later extended to the Eerste Rivier.
5. The original 2019 RMP was presented to Council and approved again on 28 April 2021. In 2022, the Roads Master Plan was modified several times, in such a way that the Eastern Link Road was given increased priority and prominence. Page 82 of that RMP is reproduced in Appendix V below.
6. The RMP was modified yet again in November 2022 to show only the truncated part to Trumali Road shown in Appendix III. This modification was the direct result of an outcry and significant opposition by residents to the proposed land development on Farm 1049 Brandwacht, which showed the Eastern Link Road in full length.
7. Meanwhile, on the other side, Blaauwklippen Agricultural Estates has provided repeated strong indications that it intends to apply for development of various of its land units, among them Farm 1457 which directly abuts the southern part of the Eastern Link Road. The most recent BAE application is contained in the agenda of the Stellenbosch Mayoral Committee meeting of 19 April 2023.
8. The truncated ELR only to Trumali Road is clearly irrational, given the thin traffic modelled for it, yet it is being prioritised in Section 7.1 and Appendix C. Should be removed. The real agenda appears to be the Brandwacht land development application and possibly Grondves and Blaauwklippen.
9. **Line item discrepancy of R15million, added at the last minute**

One of the two line items relating to the ELR is marked in orange in Appendix I. The amounts marked in orange are R15,500,000 and R17,000,000 pertaining respectively to the 2028-2033 period and the 10-year budget total. Lower down, the totals calculated for these columns were calculated to be R138,100,000 and R288,650,000. However, the CITP itself lists totals of R123,100 and R273,650,000.

The incorrect total in the CITP Appendix C item for the ELR is a strong indication that this line item was increased by R15,000,000 at the last minute. This is a strong indicator of the political and developer-driven motivation for this link.

10. All of the above shows that the Eastern Link Road project is driven not in the least by laws, principles or even traffic considerations, but by the ad hoc needs of the developers and the roads lobby. It also shows that Stellenbosch Municipality is willing to hide its true intentions and play tactical games to achieve a long-term roadbuilding agenda.

III Figure 7-3 of Roads Master Plan, November 2022



IV Complete Eastern Link Road in 2019 and 2022 Roads Master Plans



7.3.2 EASTERN LINK ROAD

The Eastern Link Road (previously incorrectly referred to as the eastern bypass) has been contemplated for a long time (see Section 6.5), but has never been formally adopted due to public and environmental concerns. However, the scale, nature and potential benefits of this project make it an ideal candidate to include portions of the link road into the 2022 RMP.

A preliminary alignment was obtained from the ICE Group of Consulting Engineers, and coded into the model as a single carriageway Class 4 collector road. This route involves the extension of Van Reede Road and a connection with Pastorie Road at the Theological Faculty with a new proposed bridge crossing over the Eerste River. Other alignment alternatives would include the widening of the Coetzenburg bridge near the CBD. However the modelling results, of alternative routes near the CBD, are expected to be of a similar order due to only marginal differences in travel time and distance.

The 2040 private transport commuter matrix was assigned onto this modified network, and the peak hour traffic results are shown in **Figure 7.4**. The next illustration in **Figure 7.5** shows a comparison with the existing network and highlights the attraction of traffic onto the new route. (Also refer to Appendix A-2)

Based on this limited modelling assessment, the following results are of interest:

- The term “bypass” is a misnomer, considering that very little traffic deviates from the R44 onto this route as an alternative access into the Stellenbosch CBD.
- The link road mainly serves as an internal connector, carrying a maximum of about 450 vehicles per hour in any given direction between the R44 and the proposed Van Reede extension.
- Traffic on the proposed Van Reede extension to Dorp Street (across the Eerste River) is however significantly higher (850 vehicles per hour), serving as an alternative to the congested Piet Retief Road.
- Traffic on the R44 near the Technopark intersection reduces as a result of local traffic using portion of new link road. Between Van Reede and Dorp Street, the reduction is more than 200 vehicles per hour, mainly as a result of the proposed Van Reede extension.

In terms of these findings, a strong case can be made for implementation between Van Reede and Pastorie Street. This should have immediate benefits, considering the lack of adequate river crossings and the present traffic demand patterns in this area.

The implementation of the Wilderbosch extension to Trumali Road and the Wilderbosch extension to (R44) Technopark would also have immediate benefits due to access restrictions on the R44 and proposed residential developments in the area.

11.6	INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES : (PC : CLLR Z DALLING (MS))
11.6.1	PROGRESS ON THE PROVISION OF A PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICE FOR STELLENBOSCH

Collaborator No: 742663
 IDP KPA Ref No: Good Governance and Compliance
 Meeting Date: 22 March 2023 & 29 March 2023

1. SUBJECT: PROGRESS ON THE PROVISION OF A PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICE FOR STELLENBOSCH

2. PURPOSE

Council to note the Section 78(1) Assessment Report, and to note the proposed approach by the Infrastructure Services Directorate.

3. DELEGATED AUTHORITY

Municipal Council.

4. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Western Cape Government's Department of Transport and Public Works (DTPW) had previously provided assistance to Stellenbosch Municipality and compiled a Section 78 (1) Assessment Report on the provision of a public transport service, for Stellenbosch. See attached **APPENDIX 1**. The report was based on a study that, at the time, proposed a conventional (largely bus-based) public transport system, that would be managed by the Municipality.

The key findings by the DTPW's, Section 78(1) Assessment Report is as follows:

- The municipality is better suited to an incremental upgrade rather than a brand new large scale bus-based system.
- Irrespective of the mechanism selected to deliver a public transport service (internal vs. external) and based on the lessons learned from the public transport implementation of George, Cape Town etc, the Municipality should consider pursuing an alternative approach to a public transport service.
- The municipality does not have the capacity nor potential future capacity to furnish the skills, expertise and resources necessary for the provision of a municipal public transport service.

Taking into account recommendations from the current Comprehensive Integrated Transport Plan (CITP), advice from industry experts, advice from the DTPW, and lessons learned from other Municipalities (where conventional public transport services were rolled out), an alternative approach to a public transport service for Stellenbosch is proposed.

The Directorate therefore proposes that the municipality adopts an incremental approach to bring about improvements to existing systems. This will allow adaptations to existing public transport modes, incremental budgeting to be used for those improvements, as well as existing arrangements with the bus and taxi operators and associations to be tweaked accordingly, rather than a "Big-Bang" new approach to be implemented.

The incremental approach, being more flexible at incorporating and assigning the different modes of public transport is most suitable for a developing area such as Stellenbosch.

The Directorate also proposes that a Public Transport Plan first be developed. The Public Transport Plan will set the framework and context of the public transport service and identify necessary projects to be implemented.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

- (a) that Council notes the Section 78(1) Assessment Report on the provision of public transport services. (**APPENDIX 1**);
- (b) that Council accepts that all the requirements of Section 78(1), has been complied with;
- (c) that Council concurs with the finding of the study i.e.
 - The municipality is better suited to an incremental upgrade rather than a brand-new large-scale bus-based system.
 - Based on the lessons learned from the public transport implementation of George, Cape Town etc, the Municipality should consider pursuing an alternative approach to a public transport service.
 - The municipality does not have the internal capacity nor potential future capacity to furnish the skills, expertise and resources necessary for the provision of a municipal public transport service.
- (d) that Council considers an alternative approach, namely the Incremental Approach that progressively moves towards improved public transport services and, over time, establishes the most efficient public transport service; and
- (e) that a Public Transport Plan be compiled to facilitate improvements to existing public transport services, identifying necessary projects to ultimately establish an efficient public transport service.

6. DISCUSSION / CONTENTS

6.1 Background

The Western Cape Government's Department of Transport and Public Works (DTPW) had previously provided assistance to Stellenbosch Municipality and compiled a Section 78 (1) Assessment Report on the provision of a public transport service, for Stellenbosch. See attached **APPENDIX 1**.

Section 78 (1) Assessment Report was based on a Public Transport Services Network Study that the Municipality had undertaken, for the implementation of Public Transport System for Stellenbosch. The study proposed a conventional (largely bus-based) public transport system, that would be managed by the Municipality. The public transport service comprises of a network of 11 local routes within Stellenbosch, and 8 long distance routes linking Stellenbosch to Klapmuts, Paarl, Somerset West, Eerste River, Bellville, Airport Industry etc. The financial cost of implementing such a service is estimated to exceed R200M over first 4 years of implementation.

Stellenbosch Municipality's Comprehensive Integrated Transport Plan (CITP) for the period 2022-2027, currently being finalized, presents a framework for development of an integrated public transport service network, highlighting the Incremental Approach as being most suitable approach to bring about improvements to the public transport.

The CITP further proposes the compilation of a Public Transport Plan to assist the Municipality to further conceptualize public transport requirements and identify necessary projects.

6.2 Discussion

Section 78 (1) Assessment Report by the Western Cape Government's Department of Transport and Public Works (DTPW) states that the Department does not intend, at this time, to replicate conventional bus-based public transport systems and will support alternative approaches to public transport. The DTPW proposes an Incremental Approach, that focusses on getting the basics right while progressively moving towards an improved public transport service over time. The report also mentioned that cities at the forefront of public transport improvements are exploring alternative hybrid models that are more cost effective and better recognizes the complexities of an industry in transition.

The key findings by the Department of Transport & Public Works (DTPW)'s, Section 78(1) Assessment Report is as follows:

- The municipality does not have the capacity nor potential future capacity to furnish the skills, expertise and resources necessary for the provision of a municipal public transport services.
- That irrespective of the mechanism selected to deliver a public transport service (internal vs. external), based on the experiences of George, Cape Town etc, the Municipality should consider pursuing an alternative approach to public transport improvement.

It should be mentioned that nationally and regionally, the public transport services industry is currently in a state of flux. The majority of rail service is not operational and severely impacted upon by vandalism and theft, regional bus services are operating a limited and reduced service and the taxi industry continues to be plagued by violence.

Given the high cost of implementing a conventional (largely bus-base) public transport service and the need to introduce austerity measures due to current economic conditions, the Directorate supports the Incremental Approach towards an improved public transport service.

Therefore, taking into account, recommendations from the Comprehensive Integrated Transport Plan (CITP), advise from industry experts, advise from the Department of Transport and Public Works (DTPW), and lessons learned from other Municipalities (where conventional public transport services were rolled out), an alternative approach to a public transport service for Stellenbosch is proposed. The Directorate therefore proposes that the Incremental Approach be used to bring about improvements to existing systems. The Incremental Approach, being more flexible at incorporating and assigning the different modes of public transport is most suitable for a developing town such as Stellenbosch.

Transport legislation such as the National Land Transport Act and other existing institutional arrangements can underpin partnerships, define roles and responsibilities and provide for the necessary agreements to be compiled. Existing partnerships with stakeholders such as Department of Transport and Public Works (DTPW), Bus and Taxi Associations, the University of Stellenbosch, Development Agreements with Developers etc., will be utilized to achieve the required improvements to public transport services.

The Directorate also proposes that a Public Transport Plan be developed. The Public Transport Plan should set the framework and context of the public transport service, identify appropriate projects to be implemented. Proposals and recommendations from partnerships with stakeholders should align with the framework and context of the Public Transport Plan.

6.3. Financial Implications

The appointment of a service provider to compile a Public Transport Plan is estimated at R3 million.

6.4 Legal Implications

The recommendations in this report comply with Council's policies and all applicable legislation as discussed under delegated authority.

6.5 Staff Implications

This report has no staff implications to the Municipality.

6.6 Previous / Relevant Council Resolutions:

4TH COUNCIL MEETING: 2016-11-23: ITEM 7.6.2

RESOLVED (majority vote)

- (a) that Council approves the proposal that an assessment of the municipality's capacity be done to determine its ability to provide the proposed public transport service through an internal mechanism and that the recommendation of the assessment be submitted to Council for consideration and decision; and
- (b) that, should the above assessment recommend the use of an external mechanism for the provision of the public transport service, a feasibility study be conducted for the provision of the service through an external mechanism.

14TH COUNCIL MEETING: 2017-11-29: ITEM 7.6.4

RESOLVED (majority vote with abstentions)

- (a) that Council takes note of the Operational Business Plan for the proposed Integrated Public Transport Service Network (IPTN) as recommended in the Comprehensive Integrated Transport Program;
- (b) that the recommendations of the Integrated Public Transport Service Network (IPTN) not be adopted at this stage, but that Council wait for the findings of the Provincial Sustainable Transport Program before any public transport system is implemented; and
- (c) that Council takes note of the progress made with the Provincial Sustainable Transport Program (PSTP).

6.7 Risk Implications

This report has no risk implications for the Municipality at this point in time, full risks will be identified and reported on, during the Section 78(3) report.

6.8 Comments from Senior Management:**6.8.1 Director: Infrastructure Services**

Agree with the recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES COMMITTEE MEETING TO THE EXECUTIVE MAYOR: 2023-02-02: ITEM 5.1.1

- (a) that Council notes the Section 78(1) Assessment Report on the provision of public transport services. (**APPENDIX 1**);
- (b) that Council accepts that all the requirements of Section 78(1), has been complied with;
- (c) that Council concurs with the finding of the study i.e.
 - The municipality is better suited to an incremental upgrade rather than a brand-new large-scale bus-based system.
 - Based on the lessons learned from the public transport implementation of George, Cape Town etc, the Municipality should consider pursuing an alternative approach to a public transport service.
 - The municipality does not have the internal capacity nor potential future capacity to furnish the skills, expertise and resources necessary for the provision of a municipal public transport service.
- (d) that Council considers an alternative approach, namely the Incremental Approach that progressively moves towards improved public transport services and, over time, establishes the most efficient public transport service; and
- (e) that a Public Transport Plan be compiled to facilitate improvements to existing public transport services, identifying necessary projects to ultimately establish an efficient public transport service.

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE MAYOR, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE EXECUTIVE MAYORAL COMMITTEE, TO COUNCIL: 2023-03-22: ITEM 7.6.1

- (a) that Council notes the Section 78(1) Assessment Report on the provision of public transport services. (**APPENDIX 1**);
- (b) that Council accepts that all the requirements of Section 78(1), has been complied with;
- (c) that Council concurs with the finding of the study i.e.
 - The municipality is better suited to an incremental upgrade rather than a brand-new large-scale bus-based system.
 - Based on the lessons learned from the public transport implementation of George, Cape Town etc, the Municipality should consider pursuing an alternative approach to a public transport service.

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- The municipality does not have the internal capacity nor potential future capacity to furnish the skills, expertise and resources necessary for the provision of a municipal public transport service.
- (d) that Council considers an alternative approach, namely the Incremental Approach that progressively moves towards improved public transport services and, over time, establishes the most efficient public transport service; and
- (e) that a Public Transport Plan be compiled to facilitate improvements to existing public transport services, identifying necessary projects to ultimately establish an efficient public transport service.

APPENDIX 1: Section 78 (1) Assessment**FOR FURTHER DETAILS CONTACT:**

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<i>Report Date</i>	<i>6 January 2023</i>

APPENDIX 1

The provision of public transport services in Stellenbosch Municipality

Section 78 (1) Assessment

August 2021